




Completion of the cross-Alpine railway on the NSRM corridor

Summary and documentation

Target audience:
politicians and stakeholders



Contents

ProGottardo—Ferrovia d’Europa / ProGottardo – Railway of Europe. Who are we?

1	Objectives of the documentation	4
2	A brief history of the Alpine cross-link.....	4
3	The main issues.....	4
3.1	Swiss context	4
3.2	Italy, Germany and Europe	6
3.3	Regio Insubrica / Città dei Laghi: a polycentric cross-border metropolitan area.....	7
4	Bottlenecks on the NSRM corridor and projects in Switzerland	8
5	The financial issue	10
6	The Swiss political agenda and possible courses of action.....	11

Attached documents

(the documents are available at www.progottardo.ch)

1. 2024 Memorandum
2. Alliance South of the Alps
3. Summary of the seminar on the issue of funding (Lugano, 10 October 2025)
4. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Italy-Switzerland 2023
5. Michele Rabino II: RFI interventions on AlpTransit South access

ProGottardo-Ferrovia d'Europa ***Pro Gotthard – Railway of Europe***

Who are we?

Our Association was founded in 2016 to promote the completion of cross- Alpine railway, in particular the Gotthard section.

It was also a co-founder of the *SwissRailvolution* Association, which promotes the *Federal Mobility Cross* on the Basel/Zurich–Chiasso and Geneva–St. Gallen axes at national level (www.swissrailvolution.ch).

Most recent activities

1. **2024 Memorandum:** intended to advocate for the completion of AlpTransit (AT) with the access sections to the base tunnels, the Memorandum constitutes a sort of 'Magna Carta' for the Association and was submitted to the Swiss authorities in autumn 2025. (see attached document)
2. **Alliance South of the Alps:** formed in 2025 as a spontaneous, cross-border legislative alliance of intent in favour of the completion of AlpTransit, it was submitted to the Swiss, Italian and European authorities. (see attached document)
3. **Financing issue:** in October 2025, a seminar dedicated to the prospects and financing alternatives for major railway infrastructure was held in Lugano, in collaboration with USI and SUPSI (see attached document). A comprehensive preliminary in-depth study is currently being prepared.

Committee

Co-chairs: Michele Guerra (Member of the Ticino Grand Council), Simone Gianini (Member of the National Council). **Vice-chair:** Gianni Ghisla

Members: Giuditta Botta, Federica Colombo, Giovanni Lombardi, Bernardino Regazzoni

www.progottardo.ch

1 Objectives of the documentation

This summary document is intended to support interested parties (politicians, stakeholders, etc.) in the completion of the Alpine crossings and the AlpTransit. Given the approaching political decision-making deadline (2026/27), the information focuses *primarily* on the Swiss situation, but always within its essential context as a territorial component of the North Sea-Rhine-Mediterranean (NSRM) corridor of the European high-speed and high-capacity TEN-T network.

2 A brief history of the Alpine cross-link

The modern trans-Alpine railway was inaugurated in **1882** with the opening of the Gotthard Tunnel. An international agreement with Italy and Germany, combined with mixed public-private funding, had made its construction possible. Since then, the railway has been an indispensable factor in the development of Switzerland and Europe, right up to the ‘glorious thirty years’ of post-war reconstruction, when the success of the road changed the competitive landscape. Partly in response to calls from the European Commission, in **1992**, following a proposal from the Government and Parliament, the Swiss people voted in favour of building the New Transalpine Railway and, in **1994**, for the transfer of freight traffic from road to rail to protect the Alps. This marked the start of the New Transalpine Railway (AlpTransit), with the construction of the three base tunnels. In **2007**, the Lötschberg tunnel came into service, followed by the opening of the Gotthard tunnel in **2016** and the Ceneri tunnel in **2020**. But the project remains unfinished; **‘the heart is in place, but the arteries are missing’**. Work has stalled halfway through – a decidedly un-Swiss approach – regarding access routes to the north and south and the connection with Europe; the separation of traffic flows; bypasses around urban centres and safety requirements; the optimisation of regional and cross-border traffic, particularly in the metropolitan area (Città dei Laghi) which is being created with the Regio Insubrica (see below) and the Lombardy region, and, finally, for the economic and cultural added value.

For further information, see:

- the AlpTransit portal: <https://www.alptransit-portal.ch/it/>
- Remigio Ratti’s book: *The Gotthard Railway Corridor. Economics and Politics of Alpine Transit*. A. Dadò Editore, 2016, ISBN: 978-88-8281-447-2

3 The main problems

The consequences: numerous bottlenecks remain on the Alpine route (see below), safety and functionality cannot be adequately guaranteed (see the accident in the Gotthard Tunnel in 2023), the environmental goal of modal shift from road to rail seems increasingly unattainable; rail is not competitive over long distances for passengers and freight; the European TEN-T system remains incomplete, particularly on the NSRM corridor, which is economically vital for Europe.

3.1 Swiss context

In recent times, the Confederation has borne almost the entire financial burden of maintaining and expanding the railway infrastructure. This was also the case for the construction of the AlpTransit, a landmark

project with an essentially European identity, as was the case in the 19th century. The Swiss state has committed itself over a period of almost three decades with an investment of approximately CHF 23 billion, drawn from a fund financed predominantly by tax revenue (Railway Infrastructure Fund, **FIF**, see below). Unlike in the 19th century, Italy and Germany, as well as the EU, did not contribute to the funding. Indeed, Switzerland has also committed over CHF 400 million to co-finance the optimisation of existing access routes outside its borders.

Looking to the future, the Federal Council (FC) launched the **Railway Vision 2050** in 2022, setting out long-term development priorities. It did so by prioritising short and medium-distance connections, adopting a 'local-to-global' approach and, rather surprisingly, relegating long-distance connections – particularly for passengers – and thus links with Europe to a secondary role. The consequence: the completion of AlpTransit, including the access lines, has been postponed beyond 2050.

This surprising change of direction was partly due to the worsening financial situation. The costs associated with network maintenance, as well as major expansion projects at numerous inland hubs, have caused costs to almost double compared with forecasts, even by the mid-point of the 2035 expansion phase (see Chapter 6 below). To complicate matters further, the Swiss people rejected the motorway expansion projects in 2024. All this could not fail to have repercussions. Thus, at the end of 2024, Federal Councillor Albert Rösti, head of the Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications (DETEC), launched the '**Transport 2045**' initiative, commissioning the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (Prof. U. Weidmann) to carry out an assessment of all expansion projects for the various transport modes that had already been decided upon or were in the planning stage, with the aim of redefining their priorities. The Weidmann report, published in October 2025, does not even address – partly because it was not requested to do so – AlpTransit and the connections with the European TEN-T network, confirming **the underlying problem of Swiss rail transport policy, namely the lack of a long-term plan and a corresponding strategy**. This shortcoming was promptly confirmed in the new guidelines presented by the Federal Council on 28 January 2026 (<https://www.uvek.admin.ch/it/trasporti-45>): **the Alpine cross-link, Ticino and the southern Alps have literally been left behind**. What is more, according to the DETEC guidelines, the north-south axis is not even due to be considered in the Strategic Development Programme for Railway Infrastructure (PROSSIF) that the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) is required to draw up for the period after 2045: in fact, the exact wording is that *"this programme sets out the direction to be taken for the long-term development of the railways, particularly with regard to the east-west axis"*, and this is to be based on the obsolete Railway Outlook 20250¹.

Swiss politics, constrained by financial rigour, strong regional interests and a narrative that regards AlpTransit as belonging to history, **is not currently inclined to envisage the planning of the completion of the Alpine cross-link and its construction from 2045 onwards**.

One must therefore ask whether there are realistic possibilities for breaking the political deadlock? **First** and foremost, a *sine qua non* is to find, given the constitutional basis², alternative and innovative financing solutions that are convincing in avoiding, through third-party funding, a burden on public finances (see below). **Secondly**, a decisive role in the relaunch of AlpTransit falls to the **Canton of Ticino**, which appears to have grasped the importance of the moment. Indeed, it is stepping up its efforts to propose **modular implementation phases** that are more easily compatible, in terms of operability and finance, with the national medium- and long-term planning, so as to allow the southern side of the Alps to be reintegrated into the forthcoming implementation phases.

Given the current geopolitical developments, and specifically those affecting the European rail network, Switzerland cannot, moreover, run the risk of becoming increasingly isolated. **Thirdly**, and as history has shown, it is therefore also essential to adopt a clear and proactive stance at European level, particularly on the part of Italy and its Milan metropolitan area and Ligurian ports.

¹ Factsheet No. 2: *An overview of rail, road and urban development projects beyond 2045* / <https://www.uvek.admin.ch/it/trasporti-45#Schede-informative>

² The Constitution provides for this possibility in Article 87: 2. *Railway infrastructure is financed through a fund. (...) 4. The law may provide for supplementary financing by third parties.*

3.2 Italy, Germany and Europe

The last decade has seen **Italy** step up the pace of its railway infrastructure renewal and its connections with Europe. Thanks in part to resources from the PNRR, the substantial investments made in the Ligurian ports are complemented in the north by three major tunnels: on the Terzo Valico dei Giovi, the Turin–Lyon line and the Brenner. However, bottlenecks remain on the Gotthard axis between Milan and Como/Chiasso and on the Simplon/Lötschberg axis with the Iselle spiral tunnels, despite the increased optimisation efforts of recent years thanks to agreements between Italy and Switzerland, most recently with the 2023 MOU³. The Italian rail network is on the verge of a qualitative leap and of redefining the structure of freight and passenger transport towards northern Europe, with diversified routes to the east, west and centre of the Alps.

As demonstrated by the establishment of the **Alliance South of the Alps** in support of the completion of AlpTransit, comprising Lombardy, Piedmont, Liguria and the Canton of Ticino (see www.progottardo.ch), interest in the development of the central axis through the Gotthard and the Simplon/Lötschberg remains undiminished, not least given its importance for the development of the Regio Insubrica/Città dei Laghi (see below).

Germany, for its part, finds itself in a particularly difficult situation. Manifest neglect has brought the rail infrastructure to the brink of collapse in recent years, necessitating wide-ranging restoration investments that will take a long time to complete. The access lines to AlpTransit are also suffering the negative effects, in particular the section between Karlsruhe and Basel, which will not be completed before the early 2040s⁴. However, RFT's efforts are intensifying and it is likely that there will be a willingness to secure the medium- and long-term investments essential to ensuring the full functionality of the TEN-T network, including connections on the NSRM corridor.

For **the European Union**, the traditional cornerstones of transport policy – free mobility, environmental sustainability, economic efficiency and international cooperation – have been joined, given the current geopolitical landscape, by the issue of security and thus the dual civilian and military use of railway infrastructure. The regulation governing the strategy based on the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), updated in 2024 ([Regulation \(EU\) 2024/1679](#)), sets out the requirements for a comprehensive European infrastructure, comprising nine corridors, including the central *North Sea-Rhine-Mediterranean* (NSRM) corridor⁵. In terms of governance, the EU's intentions regarding close cooperation with non-member

³ See the attached documents No. 4 (MOU 2023) and No. 5 (Rabino II). Cooperation between Switzerland and Italy is currently based on the following formal agreements:

- **1999** "Agreement between the Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications and the Ministry of Transport and Navigation of the Italian Republic concerning the guarantee of capacity on the main lines connecting the New Swiss Transalpine Railway (NFTA) to the Italian high-capacity network (RAC)" of 2 November 1999.
- **2012** "Declaration of Intent between Switzerland and Italy concerning bilateral cooperation in the implementation of works to upgrade railway infrastructure and rail transport services by 2020" (signed on 17 December 2012);
- **2014** "Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and the Government of the Italian Republic on the development of the infrastructure of the railway network linking Switzerland and Italy" (concluded on 28 January 2014);
- **2020** "Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and the Government of the Italian Republic on the development of the railway network infrastructure linking Switzerland and Italy along the Lötschberg-Simplon axis" (concluded on 3 September 2020 and entered into force on 1 December 2020).
- **2023 MoU** "Declaration of Intent concerning bilateral cooperation in the implementation of works to upgrade railway infrastructure and rail transport services by 2035" of 6 July 2023

⁴ Relations between Germany and Switzerland are based on the following agreements:

- **1996**, "Lugano Agreement", pact to expand the line between Karlsruhe and Basel from two to four tracks, no deadline set. The expansion is being carried out in stages and the four tracks are not expected to be completed until 2042. (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vertrag_von_Lugano / <https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/oc/2000/280/it>)
- **2019**, Leipzig Declaration. Agreement on the implementation of short-term measures to increase capacity pending the completion of the four tracks. Among other things: expansion of the Stuttgart–Zurich freight route; technical optimisation measures; involvement of France to upgrade the north-south route on the Rhine side (Metz–Basel).
- **2021**, agreement concerning the guarantee of capacity on the northern access lines to AlpTransit, confirming the Leipzig Declaration.

⁵ https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-themes/infrastructure-and-investment/trans-european-transport-network-ten-t/north-sea-rhine-mediterranean-corridor_en

countries, notably Switzerland, are clear. The aforementioned Regulation is explicit on this point, as Article 56 provides that

“The Union may conclude high-level agreements with interested neighbouring countries in order to achieve a coordinated and synchronised approach to the implementation of European transport corridors and horizontal priorities.”

From a funding perspective, the EU has adopted the ‘Connecting Europe Facility (CEF)’, an instrument designed to accelerate both public and private investment, specifically in the trans-European networks sector⁶. As demonstrated by numerous examples of European projects carried out in recent decades, the door is thus open to complementary funding through public-private partnerships.

3.3 Regio Insubrica / Città dei Laghi: a polycentric cross-border metropolitan area

South of the Alps, the gateway to the three base rail tunnels of the Ceneri, Gotthard and Lötschberg is represented by the Regio Insubrica/Città dei Laghi. Set against the backdrop of the pre-Alpine lakes, the **Regio Insubrica** draws on an identity shaped by history⁷, which also lends solid cultural legitimacy to the **Città dei Laghi** – the vision of a **new urban/metropolitan hub** between the major areas of Zurich and Milan and a genuine prospect for socio-economic development.

The Regio Insubrica, a private-law association established in 1995 for advisory purposes (www.regioinsubrica.org), comprises the Republic and Canton of Ticino and the five Lombardy-Piedmont provinces of Varese, Como, Verbano-Cusio-Ossola, Lecco and Novara (see Fig. 1). Its polycentric nature and the fact that it is predominantly located on Italian territory mean that, at the Swiss level, it is not (yet) considered a ‘metropolitan area’. Its current status as an ‘economic centre’ limited to Ticino is, in fact, highly disadvantageous, particularly in terms of spatial development and transport policy.




Fig. 1: Regio Insubrica/Città dei Laghi / metropolitan areas (red) and economic centres (blue) (Source: own elaboration, Swiss Spatial Project, 2024)

When considered in the context of its cross-border and polycentric configuration, with a population of 2.7 million and a GDP exceeding 100 billion, the Regio Insubrica/Città dei Laghi stands up well in comparison with the long-established Swiss metropolitan areas of Geneva and Basel. Indeed, by virtue of its economic and cultural hinterland – among the most significant in Europe – shared with Milan, it has excellent assets to bring to the table.

⁶ REGULATION (EU) 2021/1153 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R1153>

⁷ See <https://insubricahistorica.ch/svizzera/29/09/2025/cosa-significa-regione-insubrica/>

The importance of its recognition as a ‘metropolitan area’ is therefore essential, not least because the Federal Railways Act (Lferr / 742.101, Art. 48) explicitly calls for the improvement of connections with European metropolitan areas, all the more so where these are of a cross-border nature. It is hardly necessary to emphasise that the fundamental problems of the Regio Insubrica/Città dei Laghi are closely linked to the shortcomings of a transport infrastructure, particularly the rail network, which still relies largely on 19th-century lines and thus combines the three base tunnels with a series of bottlenecks that hamper the network’s operation at every level. The many optimisations of recent years do not allow for the absorption of the intensity of regional/cross-border traffic, nor do they ensure safety and redundancy, or the modal shift away from road transport – a condition essential for reducing the environmental burden. Nor do they allow for a functional and effective connection to the European TEN-T network.

All this constitutes a serious obstacle to the territorial, economic, social and cultural development of the entire Regio Insubrica/Città dei Laghi, with significant repercussions at national and European level. A political reorientation is therefore urgently needed, one that is open and based on cross-border and international cooperation.

4 Bottlenecks on the NSRM corridor and projects in Switzerland

As shown in Figure 2, of the numerous bottlenecks hindering the effective operation of the NSRM corridor, several are located between Karlsruhe and Milan; these therefore affect access to AlpTransit and are largely situated in the border areas with Germany and Italy.




Fig. 2: Bottlenecks on the NSRM corridor (Source: ESPON presentation, 23 October 2025, Turin)

There are many projects capable of helping to overcome these bottlenecks; some are already in the implementation phase over the next two decades, whilst others are at the study stage and are due to enter

the design phase in the medium to long term. A closer look at the situation in Switzerland allows these projects to be divided into four categories. They are illustrated in Fig. 3, with an indication, where available, of the priority level established by the Weidmann report (**WP**, scale: 1 high – 6 low / **MIS**: commissioning):

1. Projects under construction (**green**)
2. Projects in the planning phase (**brown**)
3. AlptTansit completion projects postponed until after 2050 (**red**),
4. Projects to the north and south outside Switzerland's borders (**blue**)
5. Regio Insubrica/Città dei Laghi




Fig. 3: Projects on the transalpine axis in Switzerland and in cross-border areas (Source: own compilation)

5 The financial issue

As already noted, the financial issue is becoming increasingly crucial at the Swiss level. Despite the effective funding mechanism introduced in 2014, which is allocated **approximately 6 billion annually** and is therefore independent of the ordinary budget, the resources are far from sufficient to cover the costs of maintenance and expansion projects that have already been launched or decided upon.

Fig. 4 illustrates the mechanism of the Railway Infrastructure Fund (RIF) with its resources and withdrawals.

Railway Infrastructure Fund (RIF)




Fig. 4: The Swiss railway infrastructure financing mechanism (RIF)

The annual sum of CHF 6 billion is guaranteed until 2030 and is allocated as follows: **approximately CHF 4.5 billion for maintenance and CHF 1.5 billion for expansion**. Until 2030, this includes not only regular funding but also transitional resources (1 per thousand of VAT and revenue from mineral oil taxes). Furthermore, the RIF still has to repay debts of almost CHF 4 billion and cannot take on new debt. All this means that, in the absence of relevant decisions by Parliament and a referendum, funding will be drastically reduced. The situation is therefore serious, and the DETEC notes that

“Given the expenditure required for the operation and maintenance of quality, and based on the decisions taken to date, by 2045 there would no longer be funds available for further expansion of the railway infrastructure.”⁸

A look at the projected costs fully confirms this picture. Based on the forecasts and planning of the time, on 15 March 2024 Parliament had approved a funding package of approximately CHF 28 billion for all programmes already under way and in preparation for the period 2025–2045. As late as 2024, journalistic investigations and public debate brought to light an unforeseen increase of approximately CHF 14 billion

- **approx. 28 billion** decided by Parliament on 15 March 2024
- **approx. 14 billion** unexpected increase arising in 2024
- **approx. 42 billion** in total expenditure up to 2040/45
- **approx. 22.5 billion** in resources made available by the FIF for the period 2025–2045⁹
- **LACK approx. 20 billion**

Faced with this situation, the DETEC first identified the projects that had already been approved and had planning permission. Then, it commissioned the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich to assess the remaining projects for the period up to 2045, making their funding conditional and thus

⁸ Factsheet No. 4 *Background on the Railway Infrastructure Fund (FIF) in relation to ‘Transport ‘45’* <https://www.uvek.admin.ch/it/trasporti-45#Schede-informative>

⁹ Given the current situation: 2025–2030: 5 × 1.5 billion = 7.5 billion. 2031–2045: 15 × 1.0 billion = 15 billion. Total: 22.5 billion.

proceeding on the assumption that a considerable number of projects would be scrapped. The financial limits were set in two variants, one at 14 billion and the other at 24 billion. For the additional 10 billion, an indefinite extension of the current one-per-thousand VAT levy allocated to the RIF – currently valid only until 2030 – is required; this is possible only through a **decision of the Parliament and a constitutional amendment to be put to a referendum**.

Several parliamentary motions have already initiated the debate to secure these additional funds, in order to avoid a drastic reduction in investment and the consequent deterioration of the rail infrastructure¹⁰. Federal Councillor Albert Rösti himself admitted this necessity in Parliament.

It is therefore highly likely that the Swiss people will be called upon to decide. But on what? On a 'simple and trivial' extension of the 1 per thousand VAT surcharge, without a plan or strategy for the future?

As in the 1990s, this situation calls for an urgent rethink of transport and financial policy, a rethink that opens up new prospects. **Transport policy** needs a long-term strategic concept (beyond 2050) which, starting from foreseeable demand and essential choices (modal shift and reduction of environmental impact, connections with Europe/TEN-T, economic and territorial development, etc.), outlines the contours of the desired provision and allows for a serious definition of priorities. **Financial policy** needs to discuss and identify innovative sources of funding which, by drawing on third-party resources as provided for in the Constitution, do not place a burden on the state budget. **The political project and the financial issue cannot be separated**, nor can they be addressed sequentially, given that the 'regular' resources of the RIF that are planned and foreseeable will not even be sufficient to ensure the completion of projects already underway. Furthermore, the Federal Council intends to consider only measures that do not affect the relief measures in the 2027 budget or the debt brake¹¹.

AlpTransit is not only a vital component of the NSRM corridor; it is also crucial for future development at both national and regional levels. The projects to complete the transalpine axis with access points to the north and south, as well as the crucial hubs at Lucerne and Basel stations, can only be an integral part of a plan that takes precedence over regional interests, and of a medium- and long-term strategy that necessarily includes the financial aspect.

6 The Swiss political agenda and possible courses of action

Meanwhile, the political debate in Switzerland has taken off. At the start of 2026, it entered its crucial phase, which will culminate in 2027 with the debate and decisions in Parliament, followed by a referendum. The key stages are as follows:

- 28 January 2026: the Federal Council presented the key features and priorities of transport policy, specifically relating to roads and railways.
- June 2026: the Federal Council puts out for consultation the Message on the development programme, including the priority rail infrastructure projects for the 2035 phase, which, in operational terms, is likely to last until 2045. The Message must address the issue of financing as well as the preliminary planning of projects for the subsequent phase, likely starting from 2045.
- 2031: next political deadline with a new Federal Council Message.

The 2026 Message will be explicitly based on the priority proposals contained in the Weidmann report. The completion of AlpTransit does not, for the time being, fall within this timeframe. However, the possibility of including the preliminary design in the 2026 Message so that it can then be revisited and developed further

¹⁰ See: Motion by Eva Herzog 25.3233, Interpellation by Eva Herzog 25.3143, Interpellation by Andrea Gmür-Schönenberger 24.4428, Motion by Andrea Gmür-Schönenberger 25.3953, Postulate by Farinelli 25.3080.

¹¹ In fact, the Federal Council had proposed reducing annual contributions to the RIF by 200 million. Parliament approved a reduction of 100 million during its March 2026 session. This is, however, a further sign of an uncompromising stance on debt restraint.

in the 2031 Message remains open. Beyond the need for a comprehensive national strategy for the medium and long term, several conditions are essential for this to happen. There must be

1. a coherent and convincing long-term proposal that explicitly considers the connection to the TEN-T system and sets out clear, sequential implementation stages, particularly south of the Alps. Key stakeholders: Canton Ticino, Parliamentary Delegation, Lombardy Region, ...
2. an innovative financing scheme that can draw on both private and public resources at European level to supplement funding from the Confederation and the cantons. Key players: Canton Ticino, Parliamentary Delegation, Lombardy Region, ...
3. a preliminary draft timetable for long-distance passenger and freight services, outlining traffic on the north-south axis. Key stakeholders: NSRM Corridor, EGCT Rhine-Alps, Canton Ticino, Lombardy, FOT,...
4. active involvement in the planning processes of neighbouring countries, particularly Italy, and the EU. Key players: Canton Ticino, Parliamentary Delegation, FOT, ...
5. a determined and decisive lobbying campaign to give a voice to the needs of the Southern Alps. Key players: Canton Ticino, Parliamentary Delegation, Alliance South of the Alps, ...

All of this must take place during 2026, so as to enable active participation in the consultation on the 2026 Message and in the parliamentary debate in 2027.